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I. INTRODUCTION
In the next five years, trade between the United States and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (PRC) could more than double. I Trade between
these two nations reached $4.94 billion for the first ten months of 1984,
an increase of forty-three percent from the same period in 1983.2 More-
over, in recent years, the PRC has sought to modernize itself with high
technology imports. In response, the United States Commerce Depart-
ment has promulgated an amendment to the Export Administration Reg-
ulations. This recent amendment was designed specifically to relax
export controls to the PRC in order to facilitate increase in trade.' It
represents the bright future of the Sino-American trade relationship.4
The trade relationship between the United States and China5 has
undergone numerous changes since the first trade between the two coun-
tries in 1784.6 The United States and China entered their first formal
trade treaty in 1844. 7 Since then, three Congressional Acts have gov-
erned the export policies of the United States towards China.' In Febru-
I Saikowski, Era of Economic Opportunity Begins, CHuSTIN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 1,
1984, at 1, col. 2.
2 Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1984, at 16, col. 1.
3 See infra note 83.
4 Commenting on the recent amendment to the Export Administration Regulations that was
designed to relax export controls to the PRC, Christopher Phillips, the president of the National
Council for U.S.-China Trade, stated, "In ten years of dealing with [U.S.-China trade], I've never
been more encouraged." N.Y. Times, May 14, 1984, at D14, col. 3.
5 China, here, refers to mainland China before the Communist Revolution of 1949 and the
People's Republic of China after the Revolution.
6 On February 22, 1784, the Empress of China set sail for the Orient from New York. It traded
tea for ginseng. Exports to China: A Review on the 200th 4nniversary of U.S.-China Trad 1984:
Hearing Before the Special Subcommittee on the U.S. Trade With China of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) (statement of Mr. Al Shift, Chairman of the
Special Subcomm.) [hereinafter cited as Hearing].
7 See infra note 13.
8 These are the three major acts governing the United States export policy. Congress has also
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ary of 1949, just prior to the birth of the PRC, Congress promulgated the
Export Controls Act of 1949.1 It was the first United States peacetime
export controls act. Twenty years later, the Export Administration Act
of 196910 superseded the 1949 Act. Finally, the Export Administration
Act of 1979,11 in turn, superseded the 1969 Act.12 The executive
branch's regulations that implement these acts have reflected the attitude
of the United States towards China (and the PRC after its birth in 1949)
throughout the tumultuous relationship between these two nations.
This Comment will, first, briefly sketch the history of the United
States export policies towards China. Second, it will analyze the current
controls over exports to the PRC in light of the 1983 amendment to the
export regulations. Third, it will discuss the historical impact of the new
amendment on the Sino-American relationship. Lastly, it will conclude
that the 1983 Amendment establishes an appropriate and prudent export
policy towards the PRC at this time, although in order to accomplish the
ultimate goal of significantly increasing exports to the PRC, the United
States must take further measures.
II. THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES EXPORT POLICIES TOWARDS
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
A. Opening the Door
The United States and China entered their first trade agreement in
enacted numerous amendments to the three Acts and legislation that affect export policy. Most
recently, Congress promulgated the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985. Pub. L. No.
99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985). After the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, an
executive order extended the authority of the Act past its expiration date. The 98th Congress failed
to promulgate a new act to govern export policy. In 1985, the 99th Congress finally reauthorized the
1979 Act, amended by the 1985 Amendments Act. Infra note 12 and accompanying text.
9 See infra note 21.
10 See infra note 44.
11 See infra note 59.
12 The 1979 Act expired on March 30, 1984. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2419 (West Supp. 1981). On
that expiration date, however, President Reagan extended the authority of the 1979 Act, and the
regulations implemented thereunder, for one more year. Exec. Order No. 12,470, 49 Fed. Reg.
13,099 (1984). Even with President Reagan's extension, Congress was unable to promulgate a new
act or reauthorize the 1979 Act. See Congress Clears Bill to Renew Main Law Regulating Exports, 43
Cong. Q. 1302 (1985). On March 28, 1985, President Reagan ordered Executive Order No. 12,470
to continue past its expiration date because of Congress' failure to promulgate a new export control
act. Notice of President of March 28, 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 12,513 (1985). Finally, on July 12, 1985,
Congress promulgated the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99
Stat. 120 (1985). Although the 1985 Act amends the 1979 Act to a degree, it essentially reauthorizes
the 1979 Act. Id. More specifically, the 1985 Act reauthorizes the President and the Secretary of
Commerce to "issue such regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of [the 1985] Act."
Id. at § 116. Therefore, the focus of this comment-the 1983 Amendment to the Export Adminis-
tration Regulations-is not affected by the 1985 Act.
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the Treaty of Wanghia in 1844.13 The treaty established a favorable
trade relationship between the two nations. 14 At the time, the volume of
trade between the two nations was insubstantial to the United States,
although it loomed large to China. 5
By the turn of the century, the United States maintained an open-
door policy towards China. The United States perceived China with an
almost paternalistic attitude. In no small part, the United States mission-
aries reinforced such an attitude.16 Furthermore, the Nationalist Revolu-
tion of 1911 endeared the United States to the Chinese.17 Sun Yat-Sen
and, subsequently, Chiang Kai-Shek led a "democratic" revolution that
made significant social and economic progress. Although it ultimately
failed on the mainland and was exiled to the Island of Taiwan, the Na-
tionalist Revolution was a commendable fight for democracy from the
United States viewpoint.1
As a result of this auspicious beginning of Sino-American trade rela-
tionship, the United States became China's dominant trading partner.
Despite formidable competition from the Japanese,19 the United States
maintained its strong relationship with China until the Communist
Revolution of 1949 and the birth of the PRC.20
B. Closing the Door
After World War II, Congress promulgated the first United States
peacetime Export Controls Act in 1949.21 This Act delegated the power
to regulate exports to the executive branch. Thus, the President was
13 Treaty With China, Jul. 3, 1844, United States-Ta Tsing Empire, 8 Stat. 592, T.S. No. 45.
14 "The Treaty of Wanghia," modeled after the Sino-British Treaty of Nanking, which con-
cluded the "Opium War" conferred most-favored-nation treatment on the United States and enabled
its citizens to trade in five treaty ports in China." Lee and McCobb, United States Trade Embargo
on China, 1949-1970: Legal Status and Future Prospects, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 1-2 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Lee and McCobb].
15 Id. at 2.
16 Jenkins, Dealing With the Chinese, 5 INT'L TRADE L.J. 27 (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as
Jenkins].
17 Id. at 28.
18 The fall of the Nationalist Revolution resulted from a number of factors. First, the Sino-
Japanese war had fragmented the vast mainland. Second, the fragmentation ultimately led to civil
wars. Third, the lack of national unity produced an ineffective government that could not control
disastrous inflation. Finally, the Communist Revolution led by Mao Tse-Tung gained strength by
promising national dignity after China's 100 years of ignominy. Id.
19 The Japanese surpassed the United States in exporting to China only after conquering China's
coastal provinces in 1938. Even then, Japan trailed the United States in importing from China.
After World War ii and Japan's surrender, the United States again emerged as China's dominant
trading partner. See Lee and McCobb, supra note 14, at 2.
20 Id.; see Jenkins, supra note 16, at 28-29.
21 63 Stat. 7 (1949), as amended by 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1964).
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given the discretion to implement the 1949 Act by controlling exports
"as he may deem appropriate."22 Such export controls seek to serve two
ostensibly conflicting goals of protecting national security and promoting
international trade.23 To those ends, three important factors guide the
President's discretion in controlling exports. First, export controls must
not endanger national security; second, they must promote the United
States foreign policies; and third, they must restrict exportation of scarce,
domestic materials.2 4
Pursuant to the Act of 1949, the Commerce Department, which ad-
ministers the export regulations, implemented the validated license re-
quirement for exports to the PRC.25 To export under a validated license,
the exporter must obtain approval of the Commerce Department before
exporting certain strategic items.2 6 The Commerce Department decides
to approve or disapprove a license application based on commerce, for-
eign policy and national security considerations. Reacting to the Com-
munist Revolution in China, the Commerce Department imposed
restrictive export policies towards China and, subsequently, the PRC.
The United States, in effect, placed the PRC in the same category as the
Soviet Union and other "Soviet Bloc" countries.27
In 1949, the United States also joined forces with its European allies
in an attempt to multilaterally control exports to the "Soviet Bloc" coun-
tries. To this end, a coordinating committee (COCOM) was created."
In order to control exports to the "Soviet Bloc" countries, COCOM
utilizes three methods. First, it establishes an embargo list; second, it
reviews individual exceptions to the list; and third, it reviews the list mul-
tilaterally.2 9  In 1950, the United States succeeded in persuading
COCOM to adopt the United States controls on exports to the PRC.30
Thus, the identical treatment of the PRC and the "Soviet Bloc" countries
became official in 1950.
In 1952, the United States and its allies created a separate commit-
22 Dvorin, The Export Administration Act of 1979: An Examination of Foreign Availability of
Controlled Goods and Technologies, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & B. 179, 182 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Dvorin].
23 Id. at 179.
24 See supra note 21, at § 2022.
25 See Lee and McCobb, supra note 14, at 3-4.
26 These items are listed in the Commodity Control List of the Regulations. See, eg., 15 C.F.R.
§ 399 (1985).
27 See Lee and McCobb, supra note 14, at 4.
28 Id.
29 See Dvorin, supra note 22, at 190.
30 See Lee and McCobb, supra note 14, at 4.
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tee (CHINCOM) to multilaterally control exports to the PRC.3' Export
controls by CHINCOM were considerably more restrictive than controls
by COCOM. This became known as the "China Differential."3 In
1957, however, the United States allies formally incorporated
CHINCOM into COCOM,3 a thereby abandoning the "China Differen-
tial." The United States, nevertheless, maintained its "China Differen-
tial" policy into the 1970s.
The shift in the United States attitude towards China came as a re-
sult of the Chinese Civil War and the subsequent birth of the PRC in
1949. This Communist Revolution prompted the United States to first
apply COCOM export controls and, subsequently, CHINCOM export
controls to the PRC. The United States was justified in doing so because
Chairman Mao had unequivocally announced Communist China's "lean
to one side"; that is, the lean to the Soviet Union.34 The outbreak of the
Korean War in 1950 further aggravated the Sino-American relationship.
As a result of these events, the United States revoked all validated
licenses to the PRC that had already been approved. The Commerce
Department also began to require validated licensing for all goods, in-
cluding nonstrategic goods, to the PRC. Consequently, by the end of
1950, the United States had all but completely shut the door to the
R.35PRC.
a
The door to the PRC remained shut throughout the 1950s and
1960s. In the 1950s, the United States experienced a rash of "McCarthy-
ism." The paranoia of the McCarthy era prevented the United States
from making any attempts at opening the door to the PRC.36 In the
1960s, the PRC experienced its own version of "McCarthyism." Partly
because of the United States policies towards Taiwan and Vietnam, the
PRC strictly maintained its policy of "anti-imperalism.
' 37
C. Reopening the Door
Two important factors propelled the Sino-American relationship
from the "closed door" period into a new era. First, the United States
began to experience internal pressure from the business community. 8 In
31 See id. at 8.
32 Meese, Export Controls to China: An Emerging Trend for Dual- Use Exports, 7 INT'L TRADE
L.J. 20, 23 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited as Meese].
33 Id.
34 See Jenkins, supra note 16, at 28.
35 See Lee and McCobb, supra note 14, at 5.
36 See Jenkins, supra note 16, at 30.
37 Id.
38 The business community sought to bring the United States export controls to the PRC in line
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the 1960s, the United States allies increased their trade with the PRC
under the less restrictive COCOM standards. Meanwhile, the United
States maintained its strict policy of the "China Differential." Many
commodities not exportable under the United States controls were ex-
portable under COCOM controls. The PRC simply acquired commodi-
ties that it could not acquire from the United States from other COCOM
nations. The "China Differential" policy was effective in its early days,
because after World War II, the United States enjoyed clear technologi-
cal and economic superiority over the rest of the world. By the 1960s,
however, the United States no longer enjoyed that superiority.3 9 Foreign
availability of goods not exportable from the United States subverted
many of the United States objectives in implementing export controls to
the PRC. The export controls damaged United States businesses by
preventing them from exporting certain commodities to the PRC. The
controls also failed to serve national security because of foreign availabil-
ity of those commodities.40 The changing conditions since World War II
had rendered the United States export controls to the PRC
anachronistic.
The second important factor that relaxed the Sino-American rela-
tionship was the actions of the Soviet Union. In the 1960s, the Soviet
Union began to consider possible "surgical operations" to remove Chi-
nese nuclear installations. It also built up massive military forces along
the Sino-Soviet border and invaded Czechoslovakia.4 Such political fac-
tors involving the Soviet Union paved the way for the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1969 and the Nixon Administration's detente efforts.42
The Nixon Administration's diplomatic initiatives opened a new era for
the Sino-American relationship in the early 1970s.43
Responding to political pressures and pressures from the business
community, Congress promulgated the Export Administration Act of
19694 which superseded the 1949 Act. While continuing to give wide
discretion to the President on export controls, the 1969 Act changed the
United States policy from "strategic embargo" to "qualified promotion of
with the less restrictive COCOM controls. The "China Differential" policy and the 1949 Act
seemed outdated. Bertsch, U.S. Export Controls The 1970's and Beyond, 15 1. WoRLD TRADE L.
67, 69 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Bertsch].
39 The resurgence of the European and Japanese economies had largely eroded the technological
and economic superiority which the United States enjoyed after World War II. Id.
40 The change in global economy since World War II had, for the first time, made foreign availa-
bility a significant factor in the United States export policies. Id.
41 See Jenkins, supra note 16, at 30.
42 Id.
43 See id. at 33.
44 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976) (expired Sept. 30, 1979).
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exports." 45 Like the 1949 Act, the new Act sought to balance several
interests: national security, foreign policy, control over domestic short
supplies, and promotion of foreign trade.' Generally, the Act retained
the prohibition of exporting goods that would contribute to the military
potential of countries that are hostile to the United States. The 1969 Act,
however, lifted the prohibition of exporting goods that would contribute
to the economic potential of foreign countries.47 In promulgating the
1969 Act, Congress found that the "unwarranted restriction of exports
from [the United States] has a serious adverse effect on [the United
States] balance of payments, particularly when export restrictions ap-
plied by the United States are more extensive than export restrictions
imposed by countries with which [the United States] has defense treaty
commitments."48 Thus, with the 1969 Act, Congress updated the United
States export policies.
Meanwhile, the Nixon Administration made significant diplomatic
efforts to reopen the door to the PRC.4 9 By the early 1970s, the PRC
had officially concluded its Cultural Revolution5" and begun a new era of
"turning outward." These events led to relaxation of the United States
export controls to the PRC. Consequently, the status of the PRC be-
came similar to that of the "Soviet Bloc" countries.51 Despite the 1969
Act and the diplomatic endeavors of the Nixon Administration, how-
ever, the "China Differential" was not completely eradicated.
The 1969 Act suffered from two major flaws. First, notwithstanding
Congress' recognition of the "foreign availability" problem, the Act con-
tinued to confer wide discretion to the President in controlling exports.
The executive branch exercised its discretion regardless of foreign availa-
bility of commodities controlled by the United States.52 Indeed, the De-
fense Department had substantially blocked exports of "strategic" goods
45 See Bertsch, supra note 38, at 69.
46 Id.
47 Branting, Reconciliation of Conflicting Goals in the Export Administration Act of 1979-A
Delicate Balance, 12 L. & POL. INT'L. Bus. 415, 419 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Branting].
48 Supra, note 44, at § 2401(3).
49 See Jenkins, supra note 16, at 30.
50 The Cultural Revolution spanned between 1966 and 1968. Led by Mao Tse-Tung, the PRC
sought to "revitalize revolutionary values." The reconstruction era followed the Cultural Revolu-
tion that restructured the PRC politically. In October, 1968, Mao Tse-Tung announced the end of
an era of "turning inward" and the beginning of a new phase. The United States and the PRC
immediately initiated diplomatic relations. Encyclopaedia Britannica, p. 394, 397-99 (William Ben-
ton pub. 15th ed. 1974).
51 See Meese, supra note 32, at 23; see generally Lee and McCobb, supra note 14, at 10-15.
52 See Dvorin, supra note 22, at 183.
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to the PRC despite foreign availability of those same goods.5 3 Moreover,
the Act did not solve the problem of lack of uniformity in interpreting
export standards among the COCOM nations.5 4 What was not exporta-
ble by one nation was exportable by another. Despite the detente efforts,
the "China Differential" persisted.
Second, the 1969 Act continued to place excessive procedural bur-
dens on the United States exporters. The bureaucratic difficulties in ob-
taining export licenses created a powerful disincentive to export.55 For
example, an export license application first went to the Office of Export
Administration (OEA). If the application was not routinely approved
there, the OEA had the power to refer it to the Advisory Committee on
Export Policy (ACEP). The OEA might also refer it to any other gov-
ernment agencies it deemed appropriate. The Operating Committee of
ACEP, which consisted of representatives from the Departments of
Commerce, Defense, Energy and State, reviewed the referrals.5 6 If the
OEA declined to accept recommendations from ACEP, it had the power
to refer the application to a Sub-Advisory Committee on Export Policy
(Sub-ACEP).17 If no unanimous decision was reached at the Sub-ACEP
level, the application was referred to either the assistant secretary level or
to the Export Administration Review Board at the Cabinet level.5" This
application procedure created burdens in paperwork and delays. There-
fore, the bureaucratic difficulties in obtaining export licenses to the PRC
placed the United States business at a competitive disadvantage to its
COCOM counterparts.
D. Keeping the Door Open
The flaws of the 1969 Act necessitated changes in export controls.
In September of 1979, Congress promulgated the Export Administration
Act of 197911 which superseded the 1969 Act. Implementing the 1979
53 See Gosain, Export Licensing ofAdvanced Technology to Communist Countries. Problems and
Prospects, I HAstINGS IN 'L. & Com. L. REv., 305, 316 (Winter, 1978).
54 Id.
55 See Bertsch, supra note 38, at 73.
56 This review may be very time-consuming. The OEA usually makes a decision after receiving
a unanimous consent from ACEP. If the departments represented in the ACEP disagree, a delay
will result. In many cases, such delays are tantamount to denials because the United States exporter
may be competing against a foreign exporter who is not subject to such procedural delays. See
generally Branting, supra note 47, at 425.
57 This committee consists of Deputy Assistant Secretaries from the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Energy and State. See Id. at 426.
58 The described procedure is from the Export Administration Act of 1979. The 1969 Act,
however, contained the same license application procedures. See id. at 423.
59 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-2420 (West Supp. 1981).
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Act, the Export Administration Regulations placed the PRC in the same
group60 as the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Hence, the
licensing procedures and controls for the PRC became identical to that
for the "Soviet Bloc" countries.61 The United States finally abandoned
the "China Differential" policy with the 1979 Act.
The 1979 Act, which was designed to alleviate the flaws of the 1969
Act, recognized certain factors. First, although the Act still permitted
Presidential discretion, the President no longer exercised limitless discre-
tion. The President was required to consult affected United States indus-
tries and the Congress, as well as to consider alternative means in order
to implement appropriate export controls.62 Second, the Act recognized
the competitive nature of the world market.63 The United States export
controls mechanism became more sensitive to foreign availability of re-
stricted goods controlled by the United States.64 Furthermore, Congress
recognized the need for more cooperation with the COCOM allies in or-
der to effectively control exports to hostile nations.65
The 1979 Act also took measures to resolve the problem of bureau-
cratic difficulties in the licensing procedure. The Act established time
limitations for license application reviews. All reviews of applications,
from the initial screening and inter-agency referrals to the COCOM re-
view, had to be performed within a limited time.
66
Moreover, the 1979 Act created the Qualified General License
67
which is a hybrid between the validated license and the general license.
60 For export control purposes, countries are placed in various groups. The scope of the export
controls depends on the country group to which the destination country belongs. For example,
export controls to country group Z, which contains North Korea, Vietnam, Kampuchea and Cuba,
would be much more restrictive than controls to country group T, which contains Mexico, Bermuda
and Brazil, among other nations. See 15 C.F.R. § 370 (1984).
61 See Meese, supra note 32, at 30.
62 See id. at 25.
63 The Congress realized that consideration of foreign availability and increased cooperation
among treaty partners are crucial factors in protecting the United States business in the world mar-
ketplace. Babinski, The Export Administration Act of 1979, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LU. 361, 367
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Babinski].
64 See Dvorin, supra note 22, at 194-96.
65 See Babinski, supra note 63, at 367.
66 See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2409 (1979); The initial screening process within the Commerce De-
partment must take place within 10 days. If the applications are not referred to other agencies, the
Commerce Department must completely process them within 90 days. Conversely, if the applica-
tions are referred to other agencies, then the Commerce Department has 150 days to completely
process the applications. If COCOM review is necessary, the Commerce Department is governed by
a basic guideline of 210 days. There are, however, exceptions to these guidelines. See Elliott, The
Export Administration Act of 1979: Latest Statutory Resolution of the 'Right to Export" Versus
National Security and Foreign Policy Controls, 19 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 275 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Elliott].
67 See, 15 C.F.R. § 373.4 (1984).
1104
Export Controls to the PRC
6:1096(1984-85)
Like the validated license, this new license grants authorization from the
Commerce Department to export certain commodities. But, it also has
characteristics of the general license. Once obtained, the exporter may
make multiple shipments without reapplying for individual validated
licenses.68 In creating the Qualified General License, the Commerce De-
partment intended to reduce the paperwork and expenses involved in
exporting.
6 9
The 1979 Act, like its predecessors, represents an attempt at balanc-
ing the conflicting interests of promoting national security and encourag-
ing foreign trade.70 Each export controls act has sought to confer
discretionary powers to the President while establishing criteria, albeit
nebulous, to guide the President. The 1979 Act is, hence, a statutory
framework within which the executive branch may control exports to
serve national interest. It is not a comprehensive answer to the questions
raised by these conflicting interests.71 Indeed, the effect of the 1979 Act
depends greatly on the executive branch's implementation of the Act
through regulations, as was the case with the earlier Acts.
In 1980, the Commerce Department amended the Export Adminis-
tration Regulations by removing the PRC from the "Soviet Bloc" group
to a new country group specifically designed to distinguish the PRC from
other Communist countries.72 The licensing procedure for exports to the
PRC, however, seemed to remain unchanged. Therefore, the removal of
the PRC from the "Soviet Bloc" to another country group was ostensibly
nothing more than symbolic.7"
Nevertheless, the new status of the PRC did prove to be of some
significance. The Carter Administration relaxed export guidelines to the
PRC to the point of allowing exportation of civilian gods with potential
military applications, unless the government could show cause why such
68 Id.
69 Elliott, supra note 66, at 268.
70 See Babinski, supra note 63, at 366.
71 See Elliott, supra note 66, at 256; ".... Congress has remained reluctant to circumscribe too
closely Executive discretion in fleshing out those considerations and responding to them. But the
new [1979] Act, at the same time, constitutes a noteworthy, if by no means revolutionary, step in the
continuing saga of Congressional attempts to force the export controls bureaucracy to pay greater
heed to balance of trade considerations, multilateral coordination, the right of exporters, and con-
gressional oversight." Id.
72 Effective April 25, 1980, the PRC was removed from country group Y to country group P.
The PRC was the only country in the newly created country group P. 45 Fed. Reg. 27,922 (1980).
73 Even after the removal of the PRC to another country group, applications for export to the
PRC were processed through the United States export control system for group Y countries. The
Commerce Department and other government agencies (most notably, the Defense Department), as
well as COCOM, reviewed the applications as before. See Meese, supra note 32, at 31.
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exports should not be allowed.74 This relaxation of export guidelines to
the PRC, while maintaining strict export controls to the "Soviet Bloc,"
became known as the "China Preferential."7
The "China Preferential" policy seems to have continued with the
Reagan Administration. In November of 1983, the Commerce Depart-
ment again amended the Export Administration Regulations by group-
ing the PRC with the non-Communist countries." Currently, the PRC
is in the same country group as the western European countries and non-
Communist Asian countries.7 7 The 1983 Amendment does, however,
provide several significant exceptions that distinguish the PRC from the
non-Communist countries within the same group.78
On July 12, 1985, Congress promulgated the Export Administration
Amendments Act of 1985.79 Although the 1985 Act amends the 1979
Act to a degree,8 ° it essentially reauthorizes the 1979 Act. 1 The new
Act does not affect the Commerce Secretary's power to issue regulations
to govern export controls nor any regulations that had been issued under
the 1979 Act.
82
III. THE 1983 AMENDMENT TO THE EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS
In 1983, the Commerce Department amended the Export Adminis-
tration Regulations that implement the Export Administration Act of
1979.83 The 1983 Amendment implements substantially liberalized ex-
74 See id. at 35.
75 George, Biallo, Stein, Trade With the People's Republic of China: Current Status and Future
Prospects, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & B. 21, 26 (1981).
76 48 Fed. Reg. 53,064 (1983).
77 Currently, the countries are grouped thus:
Canada
Country Group T: North and South America and nations of the Caribbean excluding Cuba
Country Group V: Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, non-Communist Asia, Austra-
lia, New Zealand, and the PRC
Country Group Q: Romania
Country Group S: Libya
Country Group W: Poland and Hungary
Country Group Y: Soviet Union, the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, Laos,
Mongolia
Country Group Z: Cuba, Kampuchea, North Korea, Vietnam
See, McKenzie, China and U.S. Trade: Recent Export Regulations, 18 INT'L LAw. 455, 464 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as McKenzie]; 15 C.F.R. § 370 (1984).
78 McKenzie, supra note 77, at 455.
79 Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985).
80 Most notably, the 1985 Act eases licensing and procedural restrictions, and it limits the Presi-
dent's power to impose embargoes unilaterally. See Export Controls, 43 Cong. Q. 1597 (1985).
81 Supra note 79.
82 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
83 48 Fed. Reg. 53,064 (1983).
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port controls to the PRC. By placing the PRC in a country group that
consists of the United States allies, 4 the 1983 Amendment opens the
door wider for exportation to the PRC. Yet, the PRC is not quite treated
as an ally of the United States. The 1983 Amendment provides signifi-
cant exceptions to distinguish the PRC from the other countries in the
country group to which the PRC now belongs.8'
Under the 1979 Act, three types of export licenses may be utilized to
export to the PRC. First, an exporter may use a validated license which
is a document issued by the Commerce Department authorizing a spe-
cific export. 6 Second, the exporter may use a general license which cov-
ers categories of exports that do not require specific licensing.87 Finally,
special licensing procedures are used in appropriate cases in lieu of indi-
vidual validated licenses.88
While maintaining tight control over the use of general and special
licenses for exports to the PRC, the 1983 Amendment significantly re-
laxes the use of validated licenses for exports to the PRC. By reviewing
validated license applications for exports to the PRC on a flexible case-
by-case basis, the Commerce Department can promote a friendly attitude
towards the PRC and also maintain a cautious "wait-and-see" approach.
A. General License
Unless the export regulations specify that export of a certain com-
modity requires validated or special licensing, the exporter may ship the
commodity under a general license. Under this license, the exporter may
export, up to a specified limit, without applications or documents.8 9
Notwithstanding the 1983 Amendment, many restrictions on the
use of the General License for export to the PRC remain. For example,
requirements for using General Licenses a) GIT, b) Ship Stores, c) Plane
Stores, and d) GFT-U.S. remain unchanged by the Amendment. 90 The
General License "GIT" governs the United States exports of commodi-
ties that originate in a foreign country. Therefore, rules governing export
of foreign commodities moving in transit through the United States to
84 Id.
85 See McKenzie, supra note 77, at 455.
86 U.S. Department of Commerce, Export Administration Annual Report FY 1981, 1, 2 (Feb.,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report].
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 1979 Act, 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2401-2420, 2403(a)(3) (West Supp. 1981); see also Babinski,
supra note 63, at 363.
90 See, 15 C.F.R. §§ 371.4, .9-.10, .15 (1985).
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the PRC remain unchanged despite the 1983 Amendment. 91
The General Licenses "Ship Stores" and "Plane Stores" govern ex-
ports of commodities to be used on vessels and airplanes respectively. 92
The 1983 Amendment also did not change the use of these licenses for
exports to the PRC. The same holds true for rules governing the General
License "GFT-U.S.," which authorizes exports of goods imported into
the United States for display at an exhibition or trade fair.9 3
In general, an exporter may not export strategic commodities to the
PRC under the various general licenses. The same restrictions, however,
do not apply to the non-Communist countries in country group V to
which the PRC now belongs. Thus, the 1983 Amendment did not
change the status of the PRC at all with respect to exports under the
aforementioned licenses.
Yet, the Amendment did bring the status of the PRC in line with
those of the non-Communist countries in using the General License
"GLR." 94 This general license authorizes the reexportation of previ-
ously validated exports that have been returned to the United States for
replacement of defective parts. Before the Amendment, the regulations
governing this license distinguished exports to the PRC from exports to
the non-Communist countries.95 The 1983 Amendment has eliminated
that distinction.
In some instances, the 1983 Amendment modifies the status of the
PRC without completely bringing it in line with the status of the non-
Communist countries. For example, general licenses authorizing tempo-
rary exports to the PRC and personal baggage for trips to the PRC have
been liberalized to allow exportation of certain non-strategic goods.9 6
Nevertheless, limitations on the use of these licenses distinguish between
exports to the PRC and exports to the non-Communist countries.
Before the 1983 Amendment, regulations prohibited exports of
items that are designated with commodity codes "A," "B," "C," or
"M"97 to the PRC and other Communist countries under the General
License "Baggage." The 1983 Amendment leaves unchanged restricted
91 15 C.F.R. § 371.4 (1985).
92 See 15 C.F.R. §§ 371.9-.10 (1985).
93 See 15 C.F.R. § 371.15 (1985).
94 See 15 C.F.R. § 371.17 (1985).
95 Before the Amendment, the Commerce Department imposed additional requirements for ex-
porting under this license to the PRC. See 15 C.F.R. § 371.17(a)(3) (1985).
96 The General License "Baggage" authorizes export of personal baggage for the purposes of a
trip. The General License GTE authorizes temporary exports. The 1983 Amendment allows export
to the PRC under these licenses except commodities designated as A or M on the Commodities
Control List. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,064, 53,065 (1983).
97 These commodity codes listed on the Commodities Control List indicate the level of control
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use of General License "Baggage" for exports to the Communist coun-
tries other than the PRC. Restrictions for exports to the PRC, however,
remain only for commodities with codes "A" and "M." Significantly, for
non-Communist countries, there are no restrictions for using this license
other than general restrictions.9"
Likewise, before the 1983 Amendment, regulations prohibited ex-
ports of items that are designated with commodity codes "A," "B," or
"M ' 99 to the PRC and other Communist countries under the General
License "GTE." The 1983 Amendment does not change the restricted
use of General License GTE for exports to the communist countries
other than the PRC. Restrictions for exports to the PRC, however, re-
main only for commodities with codes "A" and "M." For non-Commu-
nist countries, there are no restrictions for using this license other than
general restrictions."°
The Amendment also modifies the application of General License
"GLV.'' ° The General License "GLV" allows single shipments of
commodities up to a certain amount to most non-Communist countries.
The GLV value limit sets the allowable amount of export under this li-
cense to a given destination. 2 Although the 1983 Amendment places
the PRC in a group with non-Communist countries, it makes exceptions
that effectively distinguish the PRC from other countries in the group.
For most strategic commodities, the GLV value limit to non-Communist
for exports. They indicate the requirement of validated licensing for exports to the various country
groups. The letters in the commodity codes and the respective country groups are:
Code Country groups for which validated license is required
letters
A .... QSTVWYX (Multilaterally contolled to all destinations.)
B .... QSTVWYZ (Unilaterally controlled to all destinations.)
C .... QSWYZ and certain other countries.
D .... QSWYZ only.
E .... SWYZ.
F .... SZ and certain other countries.
G .... SZ only.
I ..... None.
M .... Various (Country Group control level is governed by another entry on the
commodity control list).
15 C.F.R. § 399.1(0(2) (1985); for a listing of the country groups, see supra note 77.
98 See 15 C.F.R. § 371.6 (1985).
99 See supra note 97.
100 See 15 C.F.R. § 371.22 (1985).
101 See 15 C.F.R. § 371.5 (1985).
102 The Commodities Control List states the GLV value limit for each commodity and for each
country group. See, eg., 15 C.F.R. § 399 (1985).
1109
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 6:1096(1984-85)
countries is $1,000; for the same items, the GLV value limit to the PRC
is $0.13 The Amendment does, however, authorize export of many non-
strategic commodities to the PRC under this license.
B. Validated License
The Validated License authorizes specific exports.1 4 The Com-
merce Department decides whether or not to grant a validated license
upon receiving an application indicating a "particular shipment to a spe-
cific consignee for an identified end use." 105 Before the 1983 Amend-
ment, the United States export policy towards the PRC was one of great
caution.106 In September, 1983, the Commerce Department revealed its
plans to relax export controls to the PRC.107
According to Malcolm Baldridge, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Commerce Department separates the validated licensing applications for
technological commodities into three "zones." The "green zone" repre-
sents exports with minimal national security risks.108 The Commerce
Department routinely approves green zone applications without inter-
agency review.
10 9
The "yellow zone" represents exports of high technology that can
potentially affect the national security of the United States. The Com-
merce Department reviews the "yellow zone" applications on a case-by-
case basis. The "red zone" represents exports of the most advanced tech-
nology available to the United States. If a commodity falls within the
"red zone," exporters may not export this commodity even to the closest
allies of the United States. Moreover, the list of "red zone" commodities
103 For example, commodities such as machinery for manufacturing engines and airplanes, strate-
gic chemicals, radars, and other communication equipment have GLV value limits of $1,000 to
country groups T and V (See supra note 77, for the listing of country groups). Although the PRC is
in country group V, the GLV value limit for those same items to the PRC is $0. For a complete
listing of different GLV value limits for the same items assigned to country group V and the PRC,
see 48 Fed. Reg. 53,068, 53,069 (1983).
104 15 C.F.R. § 372.2(a) (1985).
105 See Babinski, supra note 63, at 363.
106 The United States treated the PRC essentially the same as it treated the Soviet Union and
other "Soviet Bloc" countries. See Meese, supra note 32, at 30.
107 China, 20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY 9, 10 (Oct. 4, 1983).
108 Id.
109 Interagency review occurs when the export in question is sensitive enough to trigger a review
by a government agency other than the Commerce Department. For example, the Defense Depart-
ment would typically perform an interagency review. See Elliott, supra note 66, at 274. Historically,
there has been tension in the interagency review process between the Commerce Department and the
Defense Department. While the Commerce Department has sought to liberalize export controls to
the PRC, the Defense Department has sought to strictly control exports to the Communist coun-
tries, including the PRC. See Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1984, at D9, col. 2.
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is classified and unavailable to the public.
110
The 1983 Amendment, which places the PRC in the non-Commu-
nist country classification group, has dramatically relaxed the standard
for reviewing validated license applications to the PRC.111 According to
Secretary Baldridge, seventy-five percent of exports to the PRC fall
within the "green zone" as a result of the new policy implemented in
1983.112 The general export policy towards the PRC is to approve the
validated license applications, unless there is a significant risk that ap-
proval would subvert objectives of the United States export controls pro-
gram.113 The Commerce Department may approve exports that may
contribute to the military development of the PRC. 14 In reviewing the
applications, the Commerce Department no longer applies the standard
of whether the proposed export may make significant contributions to
the military potential of the PRC. Rather, the new standard is whether
there is a significant risk that the proposed export will be diverted from
the PRC to a nation that is hostile to the United States." 5 For example,
the Commerce Department would be concerned about the possible diver-
sion of proposed high technology exports from the PRC to North Korea.
As part of the new export policy towards the PRC, the 1983
Amendment lists commodities that are likely to be approved for vali-
dated licensing. 116 These items probably will not require any interagency
reviews." 7 High performance items, however, which will fall within the
"yellow zone," will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the
Commerce Department will generally deny licensing for any commodity
with "direct" military applications. For example, it will deny licensing
for exports of nuclear weapons and intelligence-gathering equipment."'
Overall, the 1983 Amendment drastically changes the validated li-
censing procedure for exports to the PRC. This is especially true with
high technology commodities." 9 In the first quarter of 1984 alone, the
Commerce Department approved 1,163 applications for exportation of
110 Supra note 107.
111 See Hearing, supra note 6, at 5-6 (statement of Mr. Malcolm Badridge, Secretary of
Commerce).
112 Id.
113 See 15 C.F.R. § 385.4 (1985).
114 Id.
115 See McKenzie, supra note 77, at 456.
116 See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,069-71 (1983).
117 15 C.F.R. § 385-4(c) (1985).
118 Id.
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technological commodities to the PRC. 2 ° These approved applications
amounted to a value of $315 million. In the first quarter of 1983, the
Commerce Department approved 555 applications for technology ex-
ports to the PRC with a value of $61 million.121 The 1983 Amendment
has had a tremendous impact on approvals of technology exports to the
PRC. The figure of $315 million from the first quarter of 1984 is roughly
five times the figure of $61 million from 1983.
C. Special License
The 1979 Act provides five types of special licenses.' 22 The 1983
Amendment affects four of the five special licenses. 123 First, the Distribu-
tion License authorizes exports for a period of one year to a foreign con-
signee who may distribute or use the goods. Exports to most countries in
the country group to which the PRC now belongs are eligible for this
license. The Amendment does, however, except exports to the PRC
under this license. 124
Second, prior to the 1983 Amendment, the Qualified General Li-
cense (QGL) authorized multiple shipments for one year to approved
consignees who used the shipments only for approved purposes.'25
Before the Amendment, the Communist countries, including the PRC,
were eligible destination countries for this license. 126 The 1983 Amend-
ment excepts the use of the QGL for exports to the PRC. 127 Exports to
the other communist countries remain eligible for use of the QGL. This
change by the Amendment represents the new liberalized policy towards
the PRC because it represents a clear distinction between the PRC and
other Communist countries. The commodities that were exportable to
the PRC under the QGL prior to the Amendment are probably exporta-
ble under the General License today.
Third, the Service Supply License (SL) authorizes servicing of al-
ready exported equipment, provided that certain conditions are met. 128
These conditions, in effect, allow minimum service that is necessary for
the normal function of the equipment. The requirements for using this
120 The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 1984, § 2, at 38, col. 4.
121 Id.
122 See 15 C.F.R. § 373 (1985); the five licenses are project license, distribution license, qualified
general license, service supply license, and aircraft and vessel station procedure license. See also
Annual Report, supra note 86, at 2-3.
123 See 48 Fed. Reg. 53,065-66 (1983).
124 15 C.F.R. § 373.3 (1985).
125 See Annual Report, supra note 86, at 3.
126 15 C.F.R. § 373.4(a) (1983).
127 15 C.F.R. § 373.4(a) (1985).
128 15 C.F.R. § 373.7 (1985).
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license for exports to the PRC remain unchanged after the 1983 Amend-
ment. Therefore, the distinction between the PRC and the non-Commu-
nist countries remain despite the Amendment. The United States export
policy towards the PRC seems to distinguish the PRC from both the
Communist countries and the non-Communist countries.
1 29
Fourth, the Aircraft and Vessel Repair Station Procedure (AVRP)
provides a procedure for exporting aircraft and vessel repair parts.
130
Prior to the 1983 Amendment, parts originating from the United States
that would be used to repair airplanes or vessels of the PRC were not
exportable. The Amendment has changed the use of AVRP for exports
to the PRC, but with a condition. Parts originating from the United
States that are for repair of airplanes or vessels belonging to the PRC
may be exported, provided that documents show the location of the ser-
vice to be performed and the type of aircraft or vessel to be serviced.'
The changes in the Special Licensing for exports to the PRC are
mixed. The 1983 Amendment leaves the requirements for Distribution
License 132 exports and Service Supply License133 exports to the PRC un-
changed notwithstanding the new status of the PRC. The Amendment
excepts the PRC from the scope of the Qualified General License,
thereby grouping the PRC with the non-Communist countries.13  Fi-
nally, the Amendment modifies the Aircraft and Vessel Repair Station
Procedure to confer more favorable status on the PRC, but not quite in
line with the status of the non-Communist countries.
135
D. Technical Data
The General Licenses GTDA and GTDR authorize exportation of
technical data136 to various country groups.137  The General License
129 The United States seems to view the PRC as neither a close ally nor an enemy. The 1983
Amendment makes significant exceptions to distinguish the PRC from the allies of the United States.
See McKenzie, supra not 77, at 455. Yet the United States takes care also to distinguish the PRC
from the Soviet Union. See Capitalim in China, BusIEss WEEK, Jan. 14, 1985, at 56.
130 15 C.F.R. § 373.8 (1985).
131 15 C.F.R. § 373.8(c) (1985).
132 See 15 C.F.R. § 373.4 (1985).
133 See 15 C.F.R. § 373.7 (1985).
134 See 15 C.F.1. § 373.4(a) (1985).
135 See 15 C.F.R. § 373.8 (1985).
136 The regulations define "technical data" thus:
... information of any kind that can be used, or adopted for use, in the design, production,
manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of articles or materials. The data may take a tangi-
ble form, such as a model, prototype, blueprint, or an operating manual, or they may take an
intangible form such as technical service.
15 C.F.RL § 379.1(a) (1985).
137 15 C.F.L §§ 379.3-.4 (1985).
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GTDA covers technical data available to all destinations.138 Conversely,
the General License GTDR covers technical data that are restricted.
139
Before the 1983 Amendment, United States exporters were seldom per-
mitted to use the General License GTDR for export to the PRC.14o The
1983 Amendment provides for exportation of more technical data to the
PRC. The Amendment does, however, establish limitations. In addition
to restrictions applicable to the non-Communist countries, exports to the
PRC under this license must meet special requirements. United States
exporters may not export technical data to the PRC relating to commod-
ities that are controlled for purposes of national security, nuclear-non-
proliferation, or crime control.' Thus, there remains a distinction be-
tween the PRC and the non-Communist countries in exporting under
this license.
The reporting requirements for exports of technical data under Vali-
dated Licenses further reveal the current attitude of the United States
towards the PRC. Upon expiration, suspension, or revocation of the li-
cense, the exporter must return validated technical data licenses to the
Commerce Department.142 Moreover, the returned licenses must con-
tain certain reports. Prior to the 1983 Amendment, the regulations re-
quired that export licenses to the non-Communist countries be returned
with reports on the time of the export and whether the export was com-
plete or partial. 14 3 However, regulations governing exports to the PRC
or the "Soviet Bloc" countries required that licenses be returned with
reports on the nature of the transaction, the nature of the payments re-
ceived, and whether the price was actual or estimated. 1" In addition, the
reports of technical data exports to the PRC, or to the "Soviet Bloc," had
to fulfill the reporting requirements of technical data exports to the non-
Communist countries.14 5
The 1983 Amendment modified the reporting requirements. Re-
porting requirements for validated technical data licenses to the non-
communist countries and the "Soviet Bloc" countries remain unchanged.
As a result of the 1983 Amendment, however, exporters to the PRC are
required only to report the nature of the transaction in addition to re-
porting required information for technical data exports to the non-Con-
138 15 C.F.R. § 379.3 (1985).
139 15 C.F.R. § 379.4 (1985).
140 15 C.F.R. § 379.4(b) (1983).
141 48 Fed. Reg. 53,066 (1983).
142 15 C.F.R. § 3790.6(a)(2) (1985).
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munist countries.146  This change is probably not significant.
Nevertheless, it represents one example of many modifications in the
1983 Amendment that places the PRC on the continuum between the
Communist countries and the allies of the United States.
IV. THE HISTORICAL IMPACT OF THE 1983 AMENDMENT
A. The Attitude of the United States Towards the PRC
The history of trade relations between the United States and China
has closely paralleled the attitude of the two nations towards each other.
For approximately a century, from the mid-19th Century to the mid-
20th Century, they enjoyed a favorable trade relationship.147 This open-
door policy gave way to the political winds that spawned the closed-door
policy for twenty years between 1949 and 1969.148 The Chinese Civil
War, the birth of the PRC, the Korean Conflict, and the extremist, para-
noic periods in both countries perpetuated this era of extreme caution, if
not complete distrust.
The closed-door policy of the twenty years between 1949 and 1969,
again, changed to cautious detente policies in the 1970s.119 Since the late
1960s, internal economic pressures in the United States in light of a more
interdependent world economy and both governments' recognition of a
common foe in the Soviet Union have triggered a period of reopening the
door, albeit cautiously. Diplomatic initiatives of the Nixon Administra-
tion, as well as diplomacy of the subsequent administrations, have re-
suilted in the current policy of the "China Preferential."'' 0
The Reagan Administration seems to have further relaxed export
controls to the PRC. The Commerce Department's 1983 Amendment to
the Export Administration Regulations accurately portrays the current
status of the Sino-American trade relationship and the more relaxed atti-
tudes of the two nations towards each other. The 1983 Amendment
changed the status of the PRC to that of a non-Communist country.
Although significant exceptions remain, this change in status represents a
symbolic and substantive change in the attitude of the United States to-
wards the PRC. The future prospects of trade relations between the two
countries seem bright. Statistics are already beginning to show the effect
of the 1983 Amendment. In the first eleven months of 1984, the United
States exported high technology to the PRC valued at $2.8 billion. In all
146 15 C.F.R. § 379.6(b)(1)Ciil) (1985).
147 See Lee and McCobb, supra note 14, at 1-3.
148 See generally id. at 3-10.
149 See supra note 16.
150 See supra note 75.
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of 1983, the United States exported $1.1 billion in high technology to the
PRC.15 1
Notwithstanding the Communist philosophy of the PRC, the
United States no longer considers the PRC to be a hostile nation. On the
other hand, the PRC is certainly not an ally of the United States. 1 2 The
1983 Amendment treats the PRC as a cautious friend. The amendment
is flexible enough to accommodate further improved relations with the
PRC. Yet, it maintains safeguards to protect the United States security
interests.
Despite the change in the status of the PRC, the 1983 Amendment
does maintain great control over general and special licensing for exports
to the PRC. The policy behind controlling validated licensing, however,
has changed radically. Under the current Export Administration Regu-
lations, the United States seems to perceive the PRC as a hybrid between
an ally and a Communist country. The 1983 Amendment clearly indi-
cates a trend towards treating the PRC more as friend than foe. Thus,
the Amendment points to a bright future for the Sino-American
relationship.
Although the 1983 Amendment represents a significant liberaliza-
tion of the United States export policy towards the PRC, both the PRC
and the United States business community have urged the Commerce
Department to further relax export controls to the PRC.153 Such a mea-
sure, however, would not be prudent at this time. Although Sino-Ameri-
can relations have improved greatly in recent years, the seemingly
irreconcilable differences between the two countries loom large. 154
Moreover, the PRC is a highly volatile country at the moment. De-
spite its government's commitment to modernize the country, there is
great resistance against modernization within the PRC.155 The resist-
ance is strongest where the commitment to modernize entails experimen-
tation with capitalism. The philosophy of Mao Tse-Tung seems to be
151 Mark, Western Red Tape Mires U.S. Sales of High-Tech to China, Asian Wall St. J. Dec. 31,
1984, at 1, col. 3.
152 Conine, Striking Terror in Soviet Hearts, L.A. Times, May 7, 1984, § II, at 7, col. 1.
153 On a recent trip to the United States, for example, Chen Muhua, Foreign Trade Minister of
the PRC, urged the United States to end all restrictions on the movement of goods between the PRC
and the United States [emphasis added]. Wash. Post, May 10, 1984, at D5, col. 2.
154 THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES, CHINA POLICY FOR THE NEXT DECADE
18 (1983) [hereinafter cited as CHINA POLICY].
155 For the PRC, modernization means cooperation with the Western powers. Although the
Chinese realize this necessity of dealing with the likes of the United States and Japan, there is a
"deeply ingrained fear of foreign exploitation and concern that Western capitalism will undercut
Chinese socialism." Parks, Doing Business With China: Big Potential, But It Requires an Act of
Faith, L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1984, § IV, at 3, col. 1.
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deeply imbedded in the Chinese mind. Total eradication of that philoso-
phy is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. In fact, reversion back to
the days of idealogical insularity is not at all inconceivable.
Therefore, the liberalization approach taken by the 1983 Amend-
ment is prudent and appropriate at this time. It encourages a friendly
export policy towards the PRC while maintaining flexibility and caution.
It seems to be an accurate manifestation of the Atlantic Council's
friendly but cautious approach towards the PRC. In China Policy for the
Next Decade, the Atlantic Council offered its balanced policy of encour-
aging friendship and "wait-and-see" caution:
156
The Committee stresses the importance of recognizing and encouraging the
current convergence of common Sino-American interests, while openly ac-
knowledging specific areas of different or conflicting interests, and leaving
substantial room for modified relations as future world events unfold and
expose common threats and opportunities.
B. The Problem of the COCOM Review
Although the 1983 Amendment is, in itself, an appropriate export
policy towards the PRC, it does not, by itself, accomplish the ultimate
goal of significantly increasing exports to the PRC. The United States
export regulations no longer obstruct exports of high technology to the
PRC. It does not follow, however, that exports of high technology make
their way to the Chinese ports. In addition to clearing the United States
regulations, exports to the PRC must also clear multilateral controls con-
ducted by allies of the United States.'57 This multilateral review body
has been heretofore reluctant to adopt relaxed export controls to the
PRC. Thus, this multilateral review remains a major impediment against
opening the export door to the PRC wider.' If the United States is to
accomplish the ultimate goals of the 1983 Amendment, it must take fur-
ther measures to eliminate this obstacle.
In the first quarter of 1984, the Commerce Department approved
1,163 export applications to the PRC compared to the 555 approved ap-
plications in the first quarter of 1983.111 Such statistics of approved ap-
plications for export to the PRC, however, can be highly misleading. For
most high technology commodities, COCOM must also approve the pro-
posed export before actual shipping can take place. Despite the tremen-
dous increase in the number of approved applications by the Commerce
Department, the United States exports to the PRC increased only ten
156 See CHINA POLICY, supra note 154, at 23.
157 See supra note 27.
158 See Mark, supra note 151, at 1, col. 3.
159 See supra notes 120-21.
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percent in the first half of 1984.16 The 1983 Amendment has not solved
the difficulties and delays in clearing the COCOM review.161 In fact,
when more applications pass through the Commerce Department to
COCOM, the backlog at COCOM grows even more. This results in a
logjam and further delays. 162 Currently, COCOM has more pending
"PRC" applications than all other applications put together.
Several problems exist in the COCOM process. First, COCOM is a
multilateral review committee whose members possess divergent inter-
ests. France, for example, has greater interests in trading with the Soviet
Union than the United States. France has argued that the guid pro quo
for France's preferential treatment of exports to the PRC in the COCOM
review process should be preferential treatment of its exports to the So-
viet Union by the United States.163 This, of course, is politically unac-
ceptable from the United States standpoint.
The second problem in the COCOM review process is the abuse of
this process for commercial gain by the participating countries. United
States businesses have argued that "American contracts are delayed in
COCOM to give commercial advantage to companies from competing
countries." 1
The third problem lies in the fact that the rate of technological pro-
gress has outdated the COCOM guidelines. Many high technology com-
modities that are reviewable by COCOM today should not be reviewed at
all. The rate of technological progress renders the COCOM guidelines
anachronistic. The purpose of COCOM review is to protect the security
interests of the Western Allies by controlling exports of strategic items to
hostile nations, not to create another bureaucratic obstacle that hinders
free trade of nonstrategic goods.
Some possible solutions to the problems raised by the COCOM re-
view process include overhauling the COCOM machinery or placing
more United States staff on the committee in order to protect its interests
within COCOM. The COCOM problem is, however, beyond the reach
of the 1983 Amendment or any other regulation implemented by the
Commerce Department.
160 N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1984, at D5, col. 5.
161 For an example of the difficulties stemming from the dual control system-the Commerce
Department's regulations and COCOM's regulations--see Export Controls on Strategic Sales to
China-The 1/7 Case, 7 E. Asian Exec. R. 24-25 (1985); the ITT is experiencing great difficulty
selling a production plant to the PRC, because of the dual control system. The plant would produce
300,000 digital switch telephone lines per year. Id.
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In summary, the 1983 Amendment, itself, is highly significant and is
an appropriate policy for controlling exports to the PRC today.
Notwithstanding the problems stemming from the COCOM review pro-
cess, the 1983 Amendment has had a noticeable impact on exports to the
PRC. It has opened the export door to the PRC wider. Yet, it has main-
tained a flexible case-by-ease review of highly sensitive exports that may
endanger the security of the United States. Most significantly, however,
the 1983 Amendment embodies a symbolic attempt to befriend a poten-
tial superpower that plays a key role in balancing world power.
IV. CONCLUSION
Reflecting the current United States attitude towards the PRC, the
1983 Amendment strikes a prudent balance. On the one hand, it sub-
stantially relaxes export controls--especially controls over high technol-
ogy-to the PRC, thereby promoting a better relationship between the
two nations. On the other hand, it also espouses a "wait-and-see" ap-
proach that indicates a cautious attitude towards the PRC. 165 The am-
bivalence of the United States towards the PRC is certainly
understandable, and for now, more desirable than the alternatives of
completely closing or opening the door to the PRC. Given the United
States incentives of entering the huge, untapped Chinese market and
seeking to balance world power, the 1983 Amendment appropriately pro-
motes a friendly approach towards the PRC. By the same token, given
the fundamentally different philosophy of the PRC and the volatile na-
ture of its politics, the 1983 Amendment prudently adopts a "wait-and-
see" approach. In short, the 1983 Amendment establishes an appropri-
ate and prudent policy for the United States to pursue in controlling ex-
ports to the PRC at this time.
If the United States is to accomplish the ultimate goal of signifi-
cantly increasing actual exports to the PRC, it must eliminate the imped-
iment of the COCOM review. If such a drastic step is politically
unfeasible, the United States must at least modify the COCOM review
process to bring it in line with the United States Commerce Department
review process. Without such further measures, the COCOM review
process will continue to function as a bottleneck to liberalizing export
165 This cautious attitude is certainly understandable. After all, a major impetus for the United
States to befriend the PRC is the global threat of the Soviet military and its policy of hegemonism.
The Sino-American friendship is a product, not of deeply shared philosophies, but of a shared recog-
nition of the Soviet threat. To a degree, the friendship rests on the notion that "the enemy of my
enemy is my friend." See CINA POLICY, supra note 154, at 23.
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policy towards the PRC and frustrate the ultimate objective of the 1983
Amendment.
John Yo-Hwan Lee
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